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Looking Backward, Looking Forward
NASA’s safety priorities.
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From the first days of the Mercury program to today’s efforts
aboard the International Space Station, human safety has always
been the primary consideration for human spaceflight. 
Looking backward, consider NASA’s first attempts to reach
space without human crews. Rockets tipped over, rockets exploded
on lift off, rockets careened off course . . . it sure didn’t look safe. 
Before we could put a life at risk, the rockets had to be
made safer. How? Mostly through the application of brute-force
engineering—essentially the “Fly, Fix, Fly” approach.
This approach did eventually lead to safer rockets; how-
ever, to produce a spacecraft intended for routine human flight
into space, NASA needed to design safety into the vehicle, not
just add safety on after a problem was discovered. This need
drove NASA to become the home of some of the world’s best
design engineers and produced some of the best system safety,
quality, and reliability engineers. 
NASA demonstrated through the Mercury program that we
could launch a human into orbit around the Earth and recover
the astronaut and spacecraft safely. During the Gemini program,
we perfected complex rendezvous and docking in space, and per-
formed spacewalks. Both astronauts and equipment operated safely
during longer durations in space. By the time the Gemini program
ended, NASA was doing what was once thought impossible.
Even with increasingly complex equipment and quick turn-
arounds between missions, the astronauts always returned home
safely. Success was becoming routine and expected.
NASA experienced a rude awakening in January 1967,
when the Apollo 1 capsule burst into flames during a preflight
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ground test. The three astronauts performing the test perished in
the blaze. The test had called for simulating a launch configuration,
so the capsule was pressurized with 100 percent oxygen, and the
hatch was sealed. Investigators determined that an electrical
short sparked the fire. In a 100-percent oxygen environment, the fire
quickly engulfed the capsule. But the test was being performed
with an unfueled launch vehicle, so it was not considered haz-
ardous! NASA never considered the possibility of a fire during
the test—crew evacuation and fire suppression were not part of
the test scenario. 
NASA responded to this tragedy by strengthening safety
oversight, clarifying responsibilities, improving communications,
improving test safety analysis and emergency procedures, and
making safety design enhancements to the Apollo spacecraft.
Congress established the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel to
provide an independent review of the safety of NASA programs
and operations. NASA established an Office of Flight Safety,
independent of the flight program office, to review all aspects of
design, manufacturing, test, and flight from a safety standpoint.
NASA recovered from this tragedy. NASA astronauts
landed on the Moon six times and returned safely. The Apollo
13 mission demonstrated that NASA could recover from a serious
technical mishap and return the crew safely to Earth. In the
1970s, NASA conducted the Apollo-Soyuz program and the
Skylab program—logging more human spaceflight success. 
For a period of time, America did not have a regular human
presence in space. Throughout the 1970s, we were developing
and building the next generation of [the] reusable space vehicle,
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the Space Shuttle. In the mid-1970s, Agencywide advocacy for flight
safety became the responsibility of the NASA Chief Engineer.
From 1981 to 1986, NASA flew twenty-four Space Shuttle
missions. Although we experienced some anomalies along the
way, the astronauts always returned home safely. 
Again, success was becoming routine—until a cold January
day in 1986, when the Space Shuttle Challenger suffered a major
failure in the seals of one of its boosters and exploded 73 seconds
after liftoff. All seven crewmembers were killed. 
In the painful months that followed, there were indepth,
critical reviews by NASA and external bodies. The Shuttle pro-
gram was grounded, and each safety practice was dissected and
examined. Safety goals and procedures were revisited; even orga-
nizational and individual attitudes were considered. The reviews
found a number of management flaws. For example, O-ring seal
problems in the boosters had surfaced on previous missions.
However, this information was not widely circulated. Concerns
expressed by safety engineers did not always reach management
in a timely manner. Additionally, the magnitude of the risk and
the associated ramifications may not have been fully understood
by the decision-makers. There had been growing pressure on
NASA to launch the Shuttle regularly and on schedule. No one
believed that they had enough data to prove that the launch was
not safe. A collective mindset evolved—if no one could prove
that the launch was unsafe, it must be safe! 
In the few years after the Challenger accident, NASA put
in place a number of improvements to its safety program. These
included:
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• Creating an independent safety organization, reporting 
directly to the Administrator. 
• Increasing the budget and staffing for safety, reliability, 
maintainability, and quality assurance. 
• Improving communications. NASA created an additional
avenue to communicate safety concerns in a confidential
manner—the NASA Safety Reporting System. 
• Strengthening risk-management programs and initiating 
significant problem reporting, trend analysis, and inde-
pendent systems assessment capability.
These improvements form the basis for today’s Safety and
Mission Assurance Program, and since return-to-flight in 1988,
every NASA Space Shuttle flight has flown and landed safely. 
How has human spaceflight safety advanced over the past
forty years? Well, for one thing, we know more. We know more
about engineering, materials, and robotics. Safety and mission
assurance tools are much more advanced. We have the capability
of improved nondestructive evaluation, and we can do computer
modeling and sophisticated “what if” scenarios.
Today, we know more about program management and
more about what it takes to fly safely. We know that there are a
million things that can go wrong, and we know that we can
never become complacent. We will not allow ourselves to be bul-
lied by schedules, and we won’t let cost constraints make us
skimp on safety. 
We don’t ask our engineers and managers and experts to
prove it is not safe to fly. Rather, we ask them to prove that it is safe.
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This is a philosophical change from the days before Challenger
and a fundamental management principle for safety of flight.
Today’s human spaceflight safety prelaunch assessment
review process is independent and comprehensive. For each launch,
NASA managers prepare a Certificate Of Flight Readiness—we
call it the COFR. Before I sign the COFR, I must personally
understand all the safety issues and their resolution. If I do not
have confidence that everything has been done to make the flight
as safe as it can be, it is my job to not sign the COFR. The
Administrator would not have it any other way.
The International Space Station heralds a new era of space
exploration for America. On this program, safety is NASA’s
highest priority. My staff performs continuous oversight and
independent assessment on the design, development, and operation
of the International Space Station. 
In sum, I’d like to describe the illustration shown [on page
74]. This picture represents NASA’s safety hierarchy. We articu-
lated the safety hierarchy a little over two years ago, as part of
our quest to be the nation’s leader in safety and occupational
health, and in the safety of the products and services we provide.
The safety hierarchy stresses that we are all accountable for
assuring that our programs, projects, and operations do not
impact safety or health for the public, astronauts and pilots,
employees on the ground, and high-value equipment and property. 
When people are thinking about doing things safely,
they’re also thinking about doing things right. And for the past
couple of years, we’ve had some pretty good results. In the time
since the failures of the Mars 98 missions that occurred in late
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1999, every NASA spacecraft launch has met the success objec-
tives, and every Space Shuttle mission has safely and successfully
met all mission objectives. Now I can’t say that NASA’s safety
program is solely responsible for these achievements, but, as we
like to say, “mission success starts with safety.” 
In the future, looking forward, we will continue to make
spaceflight even safer. That is NASA’s vision. That is NASA’s
duty to both those who will travel into space and the American
people who will make the journey possible. 
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